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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-
' Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al., LUD-
LOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
9159 
REPLY OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT TO PETITION OF 
APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO. 
FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the plaintiff-respondent, Utah Savings and 
Loan Association, and makes the following reply to the petition 
of Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co., for rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case involves the issue of priority between an unpaid 
mortgagee whose mortgages were unduly recorded prior to the 
furnishing of materials and an unpaid materialman. Only one 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
materialman now appears, namely Ludlow Plumbing Supply 
Co. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried on a consolidated record of three 
cases filed for foreclosure of 35 mortgages. As to the defendant-
appellant, Ludlow Plumbing, the trial court found and adjudged 
that all of the mortgages were prior in time and in right and 
accordingly awarded judgment for foreclosure of those mort-
gages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal this court then held that the priority so de-
termined by the District Court is subject to an equitable appor-
tionment rule and to a further restriction as to sums disbursed 
by the mortgagee after the materialmen had commenced fur-
nishing materials. The case was remanded for further findings. 
Petitions for Rehearing were duly filed and argued and now 
this court has reconsidered the issues and held that the mort-
gages, having been duly recorded in conformance with the 
statute and prior to the furnishing of materials, are prior to 
the lien claimants and further that the Ludlow lien notice was 
fatally defective because of the failure to segregate the sums 
claimed as to properties and the inclusion in it of five non-
contiguous tracts owned by several different owners. Ludlow 
now seeks a re-hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The numerous prior briefs filed by parties in this pro-
ceeding have more than adequately stated the facts in the matter, 
and we shall refer to the pertinent facts for argument within 
2 
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the discussion of the points below. Basically this is a mortgage 
foreclosure proceeding in which the court has found as a fact, 
upon undisputed evidence, that the mortgages were recorded 
prior to the furnishing of materials or the commencement of 
work upon the ground in each of the three areas covered by 
the mortgages involved in the proceeding. The lien of the 
defendant-appellant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company de-
scribes five separate subdivisions or building areas, noncon-
tiguous, some many blocks removed from others. Included in 
the lien notice are two separate Keyridge Heights subdivi-
sions in the Orem area, owned by several corporations; the 
Schauerhamer Lots, part of which were owned by Mecham, 
part of which were owned by Mid Continent Broadcasting 
Company and one of which was owned by Joseph A. Day; 
a piece of land in Provo at about 5th North and 16th West, 
consisting of 7.79 acres in the name of Mecham alone; 24 
lots in the LaMesa Subdivision in the Oream area; and 4 lots 
in the Rowley area, the last two being solely in the names of 
Mecham and his wife. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING IS REPETITIOUS 
OF THE ISSUES TWICE SET FORTH, BOTH AS TO FACTS 
AND POINTS OF LAW, IN THE PRIOR PRESENTATION 
OF THE MATTER BEFORE THIS COURT. 
This petition filed by Ludlow is actually a petition for 
re-hearing, and admittedly is repetitious of the matters earlier 
3 
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presented to the Court by Ludlow. Its initial brief consisted of 
62 pages and its reply brief later was 14 pages. Now this 
appellant would ask the Court for a soul-searching review of 
all that has transpired before. 
The inference of this appellant, Ludlow, whose claim 
was denied in its entirety by the trial court, is that your Court 
in its two extensive opinions and consideration of the case, has 
not weighed the evidence carefully. We resist any such im-
plication. Those matters not fully considered in the initial 
presentation certainly were adequately reviewed on the second 
time around. The Court will recall that not only were new 
briefs filed, but the case was also re-argued before your court. 
Two theories are presented in this re-hearing petition: 
(a) Fraud 
(b) Estoppel 
However, the well established basic elements of these defenses 
have not been pleaded, nor have they been proven. There is 
no evidence of false representations, holding out or conceal-
ment by the plaintiff and respondent to Ludlow upon which 
it could or did reply to its detriment. 
POINT II 
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING IGNORES THE 
FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT WHICH ARE 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The mortgages involved in the primary litigation con-
sisted of seven mortgages on dwellings and lots in the Schauer-
4 
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hamer area, four mortgages on lots in the so-called Rowley 
area, and twenty-four separate mortgages upon 24 dwellings 
on 24 lots in the LaMesa area. The trial court in each of the 
three cases involved found as follows: 
"23. That on December 14, 1956, after the recording 
of mortgages thereon, defendant Mecham, as owner-
builder, commenced construction on an additional 7 
dwellings on 7 lots in the Schauerhamer area. 
"24. That on or about February 1, 1957, after the 
recording of four separate mortgages thereon, defendant 
Mecham, as owner-builder, commenced construction of 
4 dwellings on the 4 Rowley lots. 
"25. That on February 21, 1957, after the recording 
of 24 separate mortgages thereon, defendant Mecham, 
as owner-builder, commenced the construction of 24 dwell-
ings on 24 lots in the LaMesa Subdivision." 
These findings are based upon substantial evidence in the 
record given by interested as well as disinterested witnesses. 
In addition, the Court found, based upon competent evidence 
in th^roiord^that p^rtZofLthe work that was done by Mecham 
on properties covered by the lien and asserted by Ludlow 
"Plumbing was commenced in the summer of 1956 without 
the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff or any of its officers 
"or^agents. It refers particularly to 5 homes in the Schauer-
hamer area, as well as to the construction of a structure upon 
the Provo area, and also the court found that the said Mecham 
had used part of the materials in general building and con-
tracting business outside of the entire areas covered by the 
5 
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liens and by the litigation, including the construction of a 
home for Wes Parks, a house being sold by a ward of the 
L.D.S. Church, and later on a bishop's storehouse, and the 
construction of a masonry building on his own home property. 
In the first decision of this Court, October 18, I960, 11 
Utah (2d) 159, 356 Pac. 2d. 281, this court did not disturb 
the finding of the District Court as to the fact that the mort-
gages were entitled to a priority because the mortgages had 
been duly recorded prior to the commencement of the work 
or the furnishing of materials upon the ground, but rather 
your Court gave full credence to such a finding by engaging 
in the discussion whereby certain priorities were accorded only 
as to funds advanced by the mortgagor subsequent to the com-
mencement of work and the delivery of materials. In fact, in 
the said decision of October 18, I960, the Court said in part: 
"We must be guided by our statute, which provides 
that a mortgage be given priority as against any material-
man who commenced delivering materials upon the par-
ticular property subsequent to the recordation of the 
mortgage. It must be appreciated that a mortgagee who is 
loaning money to a mortgage-borrower generally is not 
only entitled, but obliged to pay out the money in accord-
ance with the directions of the borrower/' 
In the November 22, 1961, decision on re-hearing, the 
Court said in part: 
"All of plaintiff's mortgages on the lots covered by 
the liens of Masonry Specialties and Central Utah Block 
6 
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were recorded prior to the time the latter commenced 
furnishing materials," 
It is to be noted, of course, that the same findings of the 
Court apply to the materials furnished by the present appellant, 
Ludlow, unless the Court accepts Ludlow's contention that 
the furnishing of the first materials relates back to commence-
ment of work on the Keyridge Subdivision more than a year 
prior thereto, at a location more than a mile remote from the 
areas involved in this litigation, under circumstances foreign 
and unrelated to the situation under which the properties 
covered by the mortgage foreclosures here involved were de-
veloped. 
To be successful in this proceeding the appellant on 
prehearing Ludlow Supply Company, must induce the Court 
to indulge in some rare equitable theories and philosophies 
contrary to the findings of fact of the trial court in this pro-
ceeding. Basically the appellant Ludlow would ask the court 
at this point on prehearing to find that there was a nefarious 
conspiracy in existence, wherein Ludlow has been defrauded 
of its materials by the mortgagee, Utah Savings and Loan 
Association. We wish to call to the attention of the court at 
the very inception that there has already been a finding by 
the District Court on this matter which apparently was for-
gotten or overlooked by counsel in this petition for re-rehearing. 
We direct your attention now to the findings of the District 
Court, No. 34 and No. 35, which read as follows: 
"34. That no agreement of partnership was entered 
into between Robert B. Mecham and D. Spencer Grow 
7 
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or between Robert B. Mecharn and the plaintiff or the 
corporate cross-defendants, nor did any of such parties 
hold themselves out as partners to the public or to the 
suppliers of materials. 
"35. That Robert B. Mecham was never appointed 
or held out as an agent of D. Spencer Grow, the plaintiff, 
or any of the corporate cross-defendants." 
As stated, this same finding appears in all three of the cases, 
though having different paragraph numbers. 
It would be wholly irresponsible of the court at this point 
to negate the carefully considered findings of the District 
Court, which spent so much trial time in hearing the evidence 
and viewing the numerous exhibits, just to respond to the 
fancied and belated claims of this appellant Ludlow in this 
unique petition for re-rehearing. 
By involved reasoning appellant seeks to tie Grow, Mecham, 
Utah Savings and the corporations formerly interested in the 
Keyridge subdivisions into one neat little package, grandly 
designating each as agent and alter-ego for the other. Un-
fortunately for Ludlow, the facts do not agree with or support 
these broad inferences. We quote from pages 39-40 of the 
Utah Savings answering brief to the brief of Ludlow, filed 
earlier in this case: 
"Even Mecham himself never claimed that he was 
the agent for Mr. Grow, as contended by Appellant, or 
that he purchased any property for and on behalf of Re-
spondent or Mr. Grow or any of the Cross-defendants. 
Don Rowley, from which Mecham bought Rowley and 
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and LaMesa properties, in his testimony said that Mecham 
told him he had been building homes for Grow or Utah 
Savings and then had gone into the Schauerhamer area on 
his own, and that was what he was going to do with the 
Rowley and LaMesa properties (Tr. 827, 828). 
"Mr. D. Spencer Grow said in his testimony, com-
mencing at page 721, that he asked Mecham to get him 
a cost estimate and pursuant to that request a cost estimate 
was furnished to him on which the prices of the Keyridge 
properties were negotiated. He further said, on page 
731, that Mecham told him that some people by the name 
of Rowley owned some acreage located just east of Crystal 
Acres, that he (Mecham) could purchase and give back 
a mortgage, and out of the proceeds of the sale of homes, 
could pay off the mortgage (Tr. 731). Mr. Grow denied 
that he had anything to do with the acquisition of land 
by Mecham from Ruben Schauerhamer and in fact tes-
tified that Mecham had owned it many months before 
Mr. Grow even knew about it. (Tr. 732). He further 
said that he had nothing to do with the negotiations and 
purchase of the four Rowley lots by Mecham or the La-
Mesa property and that he did not instruct or otherwise 
counsel Mr. Mecham to purchase this ground, or advise 
him or assist him in the negotiations for it. (Tr. 733). 
The Trial Court found the facts substantially as testified 
to by Mr. Grow. 
"Appellant is not in a position to claim an estoppel 
against anyone, except perhaps Mecham, because upon 
only one occasion was inquiry made by it or on its behalf 
9 
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to Respondent as to the monies available on the mortgages, 
and that was after construction had virtually ceased. (Tr. 
649, 650). Appellant was then correctly informed that 
there were not balances on the mortgages. If it knew 
Respondent was financing Mecham's building and Mecham 
wasn't paying his bills, then some prior inquiries were 
in order. Appellant knew that the ownership of LaMesa 
and Keyridge were different, but even with that knowledge 
failed to keep or insist upon separate accounts as between 
those two projects. If it relied upon Mecham's statement 
that it made no difference, then if there is any estoppel, 
it would have to be against Mecham and not Respondent." 
One might indulge in tears of sorrow for Ludlow in its 
present plight, were it not for the fact that it had it in its own 
power to protect itself in the transactions. Its operations and 
credit extensions to Mecham were based upon assumptions 
and guesses. This was clearly seen by the trial court. Its findings 
on these issues recite: 
"27. That during the period commencing June 1956 
and continuing until June 1957, plumbing materials and 
supplies were sold to defendant Mecham on an open 
account by defendant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company, 
and were not sold for use on any specified property or 
project described in its notice of lien referred to in Para-
graph 12 hereof, and were sold for use by defendant 
Mecham in such manner and for use upon such properties 
or projects as Mecham should determine. 
"28. That during the period June 1956 to June 
1957, defendant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company de-
10 
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livered said plumbing materials and supplies from its place 
of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, to Orem, Utah, to 
the defendant Mecham mostly by common carrier, and 
such materials were delivered to Keyridge Subdivision 
and to the LaMesa Subdivision, and none were delivered 
by Ludlow to the Schauerhamer, Rowley or Provo areas. 
"29. That at no time during 1956 and until the spring 
of 1957 was defendant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Com-
pany aware that defendant Mecham was building homes 
in the Schauerhamer area or on the Provo property or 
the Rowley area, but did know and understand that all 
of Keyridge Subdivision was owned by some of cross-
defendants, and all of the LaMesa Subdivision was owned 
by defendant Mecham; that at various times shipments of 
materials to defendant Mecham by defendant Ludlow 
were made simultaneously to Keyridge Subdivision and 
LaMesa Subdivision. 
"30. That there is no evidence from which the Court 
can determine the value of any materials or supplies used 
in or upon the buildings on any of the lots involved in 
this action or upon any of the buildings on lots described 
in the notices of lien heretofore referred to." 
We search in vain for facts which would negative these 
findings. Ludlow has not demonstrated by its briefs that any 
error occurred in such findings. Such being true, the final deci-
sion of this Court must stand. 
11 
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POINT III 
IT WOULD BE JUDICIAL FOLLY TO RETURN THE 
CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR MAKING OF ADDI-
TIONAL FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS WHEN 
THE BASIC ISSUES HAVE BEEN FULLY HEARD AND 
DETERMINED BY THIS COURT AND APPELLANT'S 
ADDITIONAL POINTS WOULD BE IMMATERIAL TO 
THE DECISION REACHED BY THIS COURT. 
It would be useless for this Court to remand the cases to 
the District Court for the purposes urged by the appellant, as 
the basic legal issues have now been resolved adverse to Lud-
low's position. 
The free use by appellant now of such descriptive words 
as "scheme", "devise", "aided and abetted", "exploit and saddle 
losses", "innocent materialmen", "sharp practices", "villains", 
etc., will not overwhelm the reason of this Honorable Court. 
No matter how it embellishes this petition for f^-rehearing, 
Ludlow must face up to the issue: The bona fide mortgage, 
having its mortgages recorded prior to the supplying of 
materials or commencement of work on a subdivision, has 
actual and legal priority over the materialmen, both in law, 
in equity and under our statutes. 
A reversal of this final decision by the Court would leave 
all lending agencies floundering when requested to make con-
struction loans. The standard practice of inspecting the realty 
for absence of materials or construction prior to recording the 
construction mortgage was followed in this case. Nowhere is 
there any evidence that Ludlow, prior to furnishing materials, 
12 
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checked the Recorder's office for mortgages or took any pre-
caution, except to continue its open account dealings with Mr. 
Mecham. 
This Court should not be burdened further with recitals 
of facts, theories and arguments. The final decision followed 
a period of over one year after the first opinion herein. During 
that time ample opportunity was embraced by the Court to 
study and resolve the very contentions reasserted by Ludlow 
now. In light of the determinations finally enunciated, no 
useful purpose would be subserved to remand the case for 
further trial procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
We recognize that this has been an involved and difficult 
case for both the trial court and your Honorable Justices. It 
is to your credit that you squarely faced these intricate issues 
and made a final decision following the briefs and argument 
on rehearing. 
The lien right is statutory. Ludlow cannot escape that fact, 
and also that it failed to comply with such statutes. We do not 
have the implied spectacle of a nefarious property owner 
taking advantage of an innocent materialman alone. Rather 
the prior mortgagee prevails over the materialman. Each has 
advanced its funds and materials in good faith upon the credit 
of one Mecham, the owner-builder. 
As must come to all cases, a final decision had to be issued. 
The appellant, Ludlow, must accept the fact that it has had 
13 
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a full and fair hearing, has briefed the matter and argued 
it twice before and cannot now ask this Court for a third bite 
at the apple. 
We find nothing in the petition for re-rehearing of a new 
or substantial nature which would merit the Court giving 
further consideration to the issues. Therefore, we respectfully 
request that the petition be denied and that the case be re-
manded to the District Court for entry of judgment in ac-
cordance with your final decision of November 22, 1961. 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
and 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKISS 
Attorneys for Utah Savings & Loan 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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